Is It Fair To Single Out FlyDubai For Pilot Fatigue Issues?

Over the weekend a FlyDubai Boeing 737 crashed in Russia, killing all 62 passengers and crew onboard. The flight from Dubai encountered bad weather on approach in Rostov-on-Don, causing the plane to circle for a couple of hours (they knew about the bad weather before departing, so had plenty of extra fuel). During the plane’s second approach they apparently lost speed, eventually causing the plane to crash, which was captured in the below footage.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nlqlRZmz5QU

It’s a tragedy which is still being investigated. I’m not sure whether it’s good or bad that this seems to be the first major non-terrorism/suicide related crash in a while. Previously a Metrojet plane crashed due to an explosion after takeoff, a Germanwings plane crashed due to a pilot suicide, a Malaysia plane crashed due to being shot down, and a Malaysia plane crashed due to…. well, we still don’t know.

Whatever ends up being the cause of the FlyDubai accident, I think we can safely say it wasn’t terrorism or suicide. Again, I’m not sure if that’s comforting or not, but it at least means that there’s something which can be learned from the incident to prevent it from happening in the future.

A large part of the investigation is centered around the pilots, who were fairly junior at FlyDubai, though not inexperienced. Both the captain and first officer had 5,500-6,000 flight hours. So they weren’t fresh out of school, but they also didn’t have the experience of a 15,000+ hour captain.

flydubai

What makes the story even more tragic is that both the captain and first officer were set to become fathers. It was even the captain’s last trip with FlyDubai, as he was moving back to Cyprus, where he was going to work for Ryanair.

The topic of pilot fatigue is a focal point in the investigation, given that the crash happened in the middle of the night. RT just ran a story about FlyDubai pilots being “worked to death,” including an interview with a former FlyDubai captain. Here’s the RT clip which I’d recommend watching if you have the time, as it’s fascinating.

Interestingly the interview takes place in Doha, which suggests to me that the pilot may now work for a certain other Gulf carrier.

According to this whistleblower (and we don’t know how much of it is true, or if he has an axe to grind with the company):

  • A survey of FlyDubai pilots indicated that over 80% thought there would be a crash at the airline
  • Both pilots didn’t have much seniority, meaning they were getting long, undesirable night flights
  • With the exception of one day off, the first officer was working 11 days in a row, shifting between day and night flights
  • There were meetings every couple of weeks with the chief pilot in which fatigue was brought up, and the chief pilot referred to those bringing up the issue as “prima donnas”
  • Supposedly one of the main reasons the captain was resigning was due to his flying schedule, and that he couldn’t keep up with it anymore
Emirates-A380

The reason I’m writing this post is twofold. First of all, I find the above information about the pilots, and about FlyDubai’s policies, to be interesting.

Second of all, I think the subject of pilot fatigue in general isn’t addressed enough. I’m a bit surprised by the whistleblower here, because pilot fatigue is an issue globally.

It’s an issue even in the US. I’ve witnessed a countless number of crews at US based airlines complain about the timing of their schedules, like a 5AM flight out of New York to Los Angeles being operated by a Los Angeles based crew (where it’s really 2AM PT for them), and a 10PM New York to Los Angeles flight being operated by a New York based crew. Add in the fact that a lot of crew in the US are commuting to work (meaning they live in cities other than the ones they’re flying out of), and that can make for some long and exhausting days. It’s what contributed to the Colgan Air crash in Buffalo back in 2009.

Even though pilots globally generally fly around the same number of hours (typically fewer than 1,000 hours per year), flying in the Middle East is especially tough:

  • There are a ton of flights leaving in the middle of the night; as an Emirates pilot on a recent flight said over the PA “it’s 3AM, which means it’s rush hour here at Dubai International…”
  • We like to think that airline crews have an amazing ability to adjust to different timezones and sleep on demand, but that’s not really the case; they’re only human as well, and I have several friends in Dubai who fly and complain about exhaustion before a 3AM flight
  • FlyDubai crews are probably more fatigued than Emirates crews, given that FlyDubai doesn’t operate any ultra longhaul flights, meaning they’re working more days; Emirates crews work a mix of short-haul and longhaul flights, which means they’re getting more days off per month

Anyway, my point is that pilot fatigue seems to be a huge issue globally. I’ve heard from pilots at all kinds of airlines that there are consistent complaints filed over fatigue issues. It’s easy to put those issues under a microscope at one airline when a specific incident happens. Last week the people complaining were “prima donnas,” while today they’re probably thanked for bringing up a legitimate complaint. But it sure seems to me like this is something which needs to be addressed industry wide, rather than singling out FlyDubai.

Ideally airlines would start rostering more logically, thinking more about the impact schedules have on the individuals, rather than basing them exclusively on meeting certain metrics. I know that’s aspirational, but as was stated in the interview, just having either mostly night flying or mostly day flying would make things a lot easier; working at 5AM one day and then 10PM the next day and then noon the next day doesn’t allow for proper rest, without a bit of consistency in one’s schedule.

Do you think FlyDubai has been especially egregious with ignoring pilot fatigue issues, or is it an industrywide problem?

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Nalliah Thayabharan Guest

10 minutes before Flydubai Flight 981 was cleared for its first attempt to land, S7 Airlines Flight 1159 and Ural Airlines Flight 2758 landed successfully at Rostov-on-Don Airport. 12 minutes after Flydubai Flight 981's first aborted landing after which it went into a holding pattern, Aeroflot Flight 1166 from Moscow Sheremetyevo made the first of three unsuccessful attempts to land at Rostov-on-Don Airport within the next 35 minutes before diverting to the nearby Krasnodar Airport, landing successfully there. Rostov-on-Don is NOT the easiest airport to land at on an ordinary day. Pilots are advised on their charts when landing at Rostov-on-Don Airport to expect severe turbulence and possible windshear in the final moments before touchdown. After the first attempt was aborted, the pilot flew in a holding pattern over Rostov-on-Don Airport, having circled the Rostov-on-Don Airport 10 times before attempting to land for a second time, since landings in non-designated airports are usually not welcomed by the airline management. Holding for 2 hours is ridiculous, if Flydubai policy was dictating that then I'll never fly with Flydubai. Flydubai should have diverted after maximum 30 mins holding. The pilot could have been tired after circling over Rostov-on-Don Airport for several hours after midnight. The pilot has flown at least three different circles trying to reorient to the runway - possibly due to"disorientation". According to ATC communications published online, before the Flydubai Flight 981 was established on the localiser- the instrument which indicates the center line of the runway when pilot is landing using instruments rather than visually, pilot reported to ATC that in case he would need to make another go-around, he would climb to flight level 80 (2,400 m). The pilot then reported that he was established on the localiser and continued his descent. At 5.5 km before the runway threshold, when the Flydubai Flight 981 was at 450 m, it started climbing again. ATC records appeared to show that Flydubai Flight 981was going around moments before it crashed. The pilot reported his intention to abort the landing with "Going around, Skydubai 981". ATC advised Flydubai Flight 981 to switch to another air traffic controller ("Skydubai 981, contact Rostov Radar on 121.2"). Flydubai Flight 981 acknowledged this with "121.2, bye-bye", which was its final transmission. After aborting its second approach, at an altitude of 1,230 m, Flydubai Flight 981 began a rapid descent with a vertical speed reaching more than 105 m/s and crashed and completely disintegrated about 250m short of the runway. The ball of ignited kerosine confirmed that the Flydubai Flight 981 did NOT run out fuel. Changing the "pilot flying" (PF) and "pilot monitoring" (PM) roles after the first missed approach has the advantage of the second approach being conducted by a “fresh” set of hands and mitigates the effect of the tunnel vision that often occurs after failed to land at the first attempt. Raw data from FR24 shows the aircraft going from a 20 m/s climb to roughly a 30m/s dive within about 5 seconds. Vertical speed of over 100 m/s. If the site data is actually correct, the climb rate seems a little bit high. The pilots completely lost control during the go around and for some reason could NOT not arrest a very-steep descent. A Boeing 737-800 "pilot flying" (PF) could inadvertently apply pressure to the control column, trip the auto flight system into CWS (Control Wheel Steering), without noticing and the pilot's continued pressure on the stick could result in >20 degree dive. A manually flown go-around in night / Instrument meteorological conditions and light weight can produce an inner ear acceleration illusion known as somatogravic/vestibular illusion. Longitudinal acceleration can be falsely sensed by a pilot as an extreme pitch-up. The sensation can be overwhelming and cause a pilot to ignore other sensory inputs, forcing the aircraft into a dive. This was a cause factor in the Gulf Air Flight 072 – Airbus A320 accident in Bahrain almost 16 years ago, the Afriqiyah Airways Flight 771-Airbus A330 crash in Tripoli almost 6 years ago and the Tatarstan Airlines Flight 363-Boeing 737-500 crash in Kazan 2 years ago. Similarly several US military jets were also lost during the early days of jet aircraft catapult launches from US aircraft carriers. Since instinct to push during the acceleration is uncontrollable, it is very important to have the right hand OFF the "joy-stick" during the launch. More than 12,000 US Navy aircraft were lost including the aircraft lost in combat, but most of them were lost in just attempting to take off and land on an aircraft carrier.

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AKguy New Member

Here's another possibility- It was known that the weather was stormy at the time. Perhaps the plane encountered a strong downdraft and/or unexpected strong tailwind while on approach. Those conditions have contributed to crashes in the past. I can understand how it could happen, as about 10 years ago I was flying to Dulles, and as we approached I could see lightning and towering cumulonimbus clouds in the vicinity of the airport. My first thought was the possibility of downdrafts upon final approach. And that's exactly what happened - we were perhaps 1000' above the ground and experienced a very strong and sudden downward motion. It wasn't exactly like falling from the sky, but it was definitely out of the ordinary and enough to get your attention. The captain immediately applied full power and aborted the approach. We went around and then made a normal landing. Upon exiting the plane, I heard a few people compliment the captain, and he just took it in stride, which made me feel good to know that he (and likely all commercial pilots) are skilled, experienced, and confident in just such a situation.

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O. Guest

@Neil S. Two *completely* different things there. Loading extra fuel for holding is a normal thing to do when weather is bad at destination, or in other situations where holding might be anticipated. The cost comparison was cost of extra fuel for holding vs. extra costs related to the diversion. My answer was a general answer to your general question.

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Neil S. Guest

@ O. "as the “cost” of getting pax home for the return flight is very high in the case where the aircraft has to divert." Higher than the cost of the lawsuits and eventual settlements with the families of the passengers and crew who died on the flight? But yeah, thanks for the lecture.

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No Name Guest

@Red You are right, there is also the Air Algérie Flight 5017 since 2014, plus a couple of commuter aircraft's.

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