Catastrophe was narrowly avoided on Saturday, as a landing FedEx Boeing 767 nearly touched down on top of a departing Southwest Boeing 737 in Austin. According to the data, the planes were within a couple of hundred feet of one another.
I first posted about this on Sunday, but wanted to share an update, both as VASAviation has published a great simulation of what happened, and a veteran air traffic controller has chimed in with his take on the incident in the comments section.
In this post:
Terrifying runway incident at Austin Airport
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is investigating a surface incident that occurred at Austin-Bergstrom International Airport (AUS) at around 6:40AM on Saturday morning, involving a possible runway incursion and overflight.
To set the scene, visibility was extremely limited at the airport around the time of the incident, with just one-eighth of a mile visibility. FedEx flight FX1432 was arriving from Memphis (MEM), operated by a Boeing 767-300, while Southwest flight WN708 was departing for Cancun (CUN), operated by a Boeing 737-700.
Both planes were supposed to use runway 18L, and the plan was that the Southwest plane would take off, and then the FedEx plane would land. Well, that’s not how things played out, as the two planes were trying to take off and land from the same runway at the same time, and came within very close distance of one another.
How close? According to data from FlightRadar24, the FedEx plane was just 73 feet above the ground at its lowest point, and the two planes were basically on top of one another with less than 200 feet of vertical distance.
Take a look at the below illustration from Flightradar24…
Below is the ATC audio, which gives you a sense of what happened in the moments leading up to this incident (to make things clearer, I’ve just transcribed the essential communication that’s relevant to this situation):
Tower: “FedEx 1432 heavy, Austin Tower, 18L, cleared to land.”
FedEx pilot: “Cleared to land, 18L, FedEx 1432 heavy.”
Southwest pilot: “Tower, Southwest 708, we’re short of runway 18L, we’re ready.”
Tower: “Southwest 708, Austin Tower, 18L, cleared for takeoff, traffic three mile final, it’s a heavy 767.”
Southwest pilot: “Okay, cleared for takeoff 18L, copy the traffic, Southwest 708.”
FedEx pilot: “Tower confirm, FedEx 1432 heavy, cleared to land 18L?”
Tower: “FedEx 1432 heavy, that is affirmative, you are cleared to land, traffic is departing prior to arrival.”
FedEx pilot: “Roger.”
Tower: “Southwest, confirm on the roll.”
Southwest pilot: “Rolling now.”
FedEx pilot: “Southwest abort, FedEx is on the go.”
Southwest pilot: “Negative.”
VASAviation also has a fantastic simulation of the incident along with the air traffic control audio, which gives you the best sense of what happened.
The Southwest Boeing 737 still ended up taking off (it was too late to abort), while the FedEx Boeing 767 ended up performing a go around, so the planes were very close to one another. The FedEx plane turned left after its go around, while the Southwest plane turned right after its takeoff.
The FedEx plane successfully landed in Austin after its go around, while the Southwest plane continued to Cancun. Presumably most passengers had no clue how close they were to a complete disaster.
How did this Southwest & FedEx situation happen?
Obviously the NTSB will perform a full investigation, but a few things stand out here:
- In terms of piloting, it’s pretty clear the FedEx pilots did nothing wrong here, as they received landing permission, and they even confirmed that they were cleared to land; their focus and professionalism probably saved this situation
- It’s interesting that the FedEx pilots gave a direct air traffic control instruction to the Southwest pilots; that’s obviously not something that normally happens, but I suppose in a desperate situation where there’s very little visibility and you see disaster about to happen, that’s what you do
- The Southwest pilots are informed there’s a Boeing 767 on three mile final, and based on the air traffic control communications, it seems like they don’t take off immediately, since the controller follows up and asks if they’re even rolling yet; it’ll be interesting to see if a delayed takeoff played a part in this incident
- Taking off while a plane is on three mile final doesn’t give you much of a margin to begin with, let alone with almost no visibility; presumably the Southwest pilots were taking their time because visibility was limited and they wanted to be careful, but why did they accept takeoff clearance when they were warned a plane was that close to arriving?
- Of course the only other party here is the air traffic controller; did he communicate clearly and correctly, and was he cutting things too close, clearing a 737 for takeoff when there was a 767 on three mile final with virtually no visibility?
I’m sure we’ll learn more details over time when an investigation is conducted. But honestly, this incident isn’t some alarmist clickbait story, but rather this is honestly a terrifying incident that could have had a very different outcome. The Tenerife Disaster comes to mind, which is to this day the deadliest aircraft accident in history. This happened when two 747s collided on a runway, also due to limited visibility.
One has to wonder if this is just a coincidence, or if we’re seeing a general increase in incidents, as we’re seeing less experience in the cockpit and in air traffic control towers, with lots of new hires across the industry. This incident comes just a few weeks after an American 777 and Delta 737 nearly collided on a runway at JFK.
An air traffic controller’s take on this situation
An air traffic controller left a comment on this post, which provided some useful perspective. I figured I’d share it here, because I’m sure others will appreciate this as well:
I’ve been a controller for 26 years now and this incident has left me absolutely speechless. There is no defence for what I can only describe as one of the most horrifying displays of non-controlling you will ever see.
First, its CATIII conditions with very limited visibility. The plan to depart SWA ahead of FDX would have been a bit ‘sporting’ on a clear VFR day – Generally you’d not want to depart anyone holding short with inbound traffic any less than 4 miles away. In full blown low vis operations its absolutely ridiculous. Second on a CATIII approach the ILS needs to be protected because signal interference from objects within the ILS sensitive area can result in loss of accurate guidance from the localiser and glideslope. On an autoland that could cause crash because the autopilot is following that guidance all the way to touchdown. This is why CATIII holds are further back from the regular holding points.
Similarly on runways where there a mixed mode of operation extra spacing is required between arrivals to ensure that any departures in the gaps are airborne and past the end of the runway before the inbound gets to a certain distance from touchdown – which off the top of my head I think is at least 2 miles. This is why when fog hits and we go to CATIII ops the delays build up because the runway capacity goes down massively.
In this case there was zero hope of the SWA being airborne and past the end of the runway before the FDX was 2 miles from touchdown, so the moment he lined SWA up the FDX approach was compromised. You can run it tight on a visual or CATI approach but absolutely not on a CATIII.
What I found more disturbing than anything besides the gross error of judgement in his initial plan was once it became apparent that the plan was not working he simply gave up controlling at that point and allowed the aircraft to sort themselves out. Once he identified the SWA was slow to roll (totally understandable given the low vis) it should have been blindingly obvious that this needed to be fixed immediately. SWA, cancel takeoff clearance and hold position. FDX go-around. That was the only option at that point.
He would have been unable to see either of the aircraft given the reported RVR, so relying on a visual separation solution was out of the question. Instead he did absolutely nothing which is unforgivable. Even more so given that none of the pilots could see each other and would effectively be flying blind in regards to what the other was doing. Also at that low height TCAS would be inhibited so that would not offer them any help either.
Mercifully the FDX crew seemed to be several steps ahead of everyone else and they absolutely saved this situation from being catastrophic. They should be commended and awarded for their excellent airmanship. The only thing I would say about the SWA crew is they should frankly have refused the takeoff clearance hearing landing traffic was only 3 miles out in those conditions. It was an unnecessarily risky clearance from the get go.
This incident makes me feel sick honestly. Every controller at some point in their career makes an error of judgement, which is why we have safety margins. When you make one though its critical you recognise it and then do something about it. Doing nothing really is an unforgivable sin. This unfortunately was appalling ‘controlling’ from start to finish. The initial plan was bad – it was never going to work in those conditions and then he somehow managed to make it all worse by doing nothing to fix it.
I also can’t believe that the controller was apparently not relieved from position immediately because he was talking to the FDX again on its 2nd approach. A just safety culture requires the immediate removal from position of anyone involved in an OI on a no blame basis so that the facts can be looked into and the individual involved can gather themselves.
This whole incident just boggles my mind.
Bottom line
A FedEx Boeing 767 and Southwest Boeing 737 nearly collided on a runway at Austin Airport on Saturday morning while there was thick fog. The Southwest 737 was supposed to depart shortly before the FedEx 767 landed, but that’s not how things played out.
Rather the FedEx 767 performed a go around at the same time that the Southwest 737 was taking off. An NTSB investigation should reveal more details about what happened. Thank goodness this ended the way it did.
What do you make of this incident?
Listening to the actual radio traffic on the VAS video, all I can say is... Those FDX pilots had ice running in their veins. Stayed cool and calm even as they were about to create a double decker airplane sandwich.
If I was in that cockpit I'd probably be like "Southwest, get the F out of my way! Oh God, we're all gonna die!!" I mean, these guys didn't even ask for a change of pants after they finally landed! Hats off!
Like several here, I’m also a former ATC, with certifications for Enroute Center, Approach Control, and ATC Tower. I’m also hold an Airline Transport Pilot certificate, with airline and corporate jet experience.
There are so many mistakes and oversights here that have already been mentioned. Yes, FedEx did everything correct, it seems. Southwest might have some blame (could have denied the takeoff clearance, could have gotten airborne sooner).
I’d say both pilots should have...
Like several here, I’m also a former ATC, with certifications for Enroute Center, Approach Control, and ATC Tower. I’m also hold an Airline Transport Pilot certificate, with airline and corporate jet experience.
There are so many mistakes and oversights here that have already been mentioned. Yes, FedEx did everything correct, it seems. Southwest might have some blame (could have denied the takeoff clearance, could have gotten airborne sooner).
I’d say both pilots should have been looking for a way to get their courses to diverge, which it appears that Southwest did on their own (to the right). They likely could HEAR the FedEx aircraft overhead. FedEx likely physically saw the Boeing 737, with a 1400 foot Runway Visual Range (RVR). There’s no way that the Southwest 737 could have seen FedEx.
Their Terminal Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) onboard both aircraft may have been inhibited do the the proximity to the runway.
Which brings me to ATC. First and foremost is the lack of awareness or understanding of what it meant to the “Local” controller when FedEx 1432 checked on with a “CAT III” approach. The controller was not permitted to put an aircraft within the “ILS critical area”, let alone put one on the runway. That was ATC mistake number one. I wouldn’t be surprised if this is a training oversight.
Inside the FAA handbook for ATC, the FAA ORDER 7110.65, Section 6−2−1 has a section called MINIMA ON DIVERGING COURSES that has specific requirements to separate aircraft from the same airport. The aircraft should be instructed to fly courses diverging by 45 degrees or more after departing the same or adjacent airports. This controller either froze, or just didn’t know what to do. He should have, at a MINIMUM, taken control and gotten the two aircraft diverging as soon as possible, once he become aware of the incident.
At a minimum, he was aware when the FedEx Captain said they were going around.
The possible ad hoc phraseology might be:
“FedEx 1432, turn 30 degrees left IMMEDIATELY, traffic beneath you is a Boeing 737”
“Southwest 708, turn 30 degrees right IMMEDIATELY, traffic is a Heavy Boeing 767 above you, caution wake turbulence”
Then, he should have been punching up the landline, calling the departure control (likely in the same building) about what he just did.
It’s a failure of the FAA if there wasn’t somebody to immediately relieve this Local controller. Somebody else should have cleared FedEx to land for the second time.
ATC made the following errors:
1) Placed an aircraft in ILS critical area with another aircraft on a coupled ILS to CAT III minima
2) Did not ensure separation of the aircraft on the runway (primary job of the Local tower controller)
3) Did not ensure separation of the aircraft in the air
4) Did not take control of the situation
5) The same Local tower controller stayed on position after the ordeal (after an “operational error”)
There may be additional ATC mistakes in management, training, staffing, etc, at Austin, Texas.
Retired controller here and not only to ditto the other controller I'll add a thing or two. First, if I recall correctly the critical area needs to be protected when someone is within 5 miles conduction a coupled approach which FedEx would be doing.
I've got nothing good to say about the actions of the controller and only excuse I can think of is that he might be inexperienced and certainly at that airport...
Retired controller here and not only to ditto the other controller I'll add a thing or two. First, if I recall correctly the critical area needs to be protected when someone is within 5 miles conduction a coupled approach which FedEx would be doing.
I've got nothing good to say about the actions of the controller and only excuse I can think of is that he might be inexperienced and certainly at that airport conditions are very rarely that poor. I'm willing to bet he and probably other controllers who very rarely operate in such conditions can recite the required separation needed in such instances. I also believe we were dealing with freezing fog and there was freezing rain throughout Texas. That runway, no matter how well the ground people are, was contaminated. Whereas SWA might have normally taken off "rolling" on a clear day with a dry runway, that was not going to happen in this situation. He would go slow onto the runway.
Then there's the SWA pilot(s). B767 on a there mile final? You say no thanks to the takeoff clearance. There's two guys in that cockpit and the 1st officer is also trained to speak up. The only thing I can think of is maybe they had been deiced and had already been waiting for takeoff for a bit. There's the possibility they feared any more delay would require going back to the ramp to get a 2nd deicing. The interviews will tell more if those pilots are truthful.
FedEx was the only one aware of the situation and it shows when he asked if he's cleared to land again. That's a pilot paying attention and making sure the controller knows he's still out there and hasn't been forgotten. His way of saying "you know we're still here, right?"
I'm not an ATC controller, but it would be interesting to know the deicing information for additional context. If SWA was in danger of requiring a repeat deicing, which would put them in the back of the line to takeoff again, probably adding 30? minutes to their departure delay, then it's human nature to try to push the safety margins and get off the ground.
I've been on multiple deicing runs (as a passenger) in...
I'm not an ATC controller, but it would be interesting to know the deicing information for additional context. If SWA was in danger of requiring a repeat deicing, which would put them in the back of the line to takeoff again, probably adding 30? minutes to their departure delay, then it's human nature to try to push the safety margins and get off the ground.
I've been on multiple deicing runs (as a passenger) in snowy airports like O'Hare (worst of both worlds: can get severe snow, *and* it's a huge airport so even the quickest taxi times leave you very little time to takeoff before you have to get deiced again), and you can sense the frustration in the pilots' voices when they announce we have to go back for yet another deicing. Perhaps that was at play here as well.
It was the same human nature that played a part in the Tenerife disaster: the KLM crew was worried about timing out since they were already significantly delayed, and that tunnel vision on getting off the ground in time led them to overlook some of the warnng signs that they might otherwise have picked up on.
I'm just glad that we're focused on diversity hires for pilot and ATC positions as opposed to hiring the best person for the job. This is equity.
STUPID comment of the day goes to YOU.
Why ?
I was hoping VASAviation to post some visualization that shows vertical separation in addition to the usual 2d top down.
I was holding one question until a little better visuals are made, but I guess that's not happening.
If the separation was more, could wake turbulence made the situation worse?
Wake turbulence would play no factor until the go around. A B737 right below the B767 could be an extremely big deal.
How many controllers would Austin have on duty at 6:40am on a Saturday morning? And how late was that one out on Friday night?
Mornings are busy at Austin, so there likely would have been one tower controller and two on approach. This controller is fairly new (to KAUS, at least), so I can't speak to him personally, but KAUS controllers are very professional and some of the best given the very challenging conditions they work in. The thought that they would have been "out on Friday night" is laughable.
The controller clearly shouldn't have tried to allow a...
Mornings are busy at Austin, so there likely would have been one tower controller and two on approach. This controller is fairly new (to KAUS, at least), so I can't speak to him personally, but KAUS controllers are very professional and some of the best given the very challenging conditions they work in. The thought that they would have been "out on Friday night" is laughable.
The controller clearly shouldn't have tried to allow a takeoff before a 767 on a 3-mi final, and the WN pilot shouldn't have accepted the clearance unless he was ready to do a rolling takeoff.
If SWA rolled immediately and FDX went around, FDX probably would have overtaken SWA anyway. That is why, in IFR conditions, you wouldn’t issue a takeoff clearance. If FDX was at 120kts three miles out, he is one and a half minutes away, taxiing on to the runway could and it looks like in this case, would take the same amount of time.
A very naive question….is is standard to go left on a fly over? What if both planes had gone in the same direction?
Each approach type has missed approach procedures, so the controller would have known exactly where the FedEx pilot was going to go.
If you were to ask a 100 airline pilots what airline gets the most preferential treatment from ATC more would pick Southwest than any other airline. Just ask Virgin Atlantic.
KAUS has an uncontrolled ramp, which means ATC had NOTHING to do with the WN jet that pulled out in front of the Virgin one. WN doesn't get special treatment. That said, they have one of the quicker company-approved taxi speeds, and their crews don't hesitate to do a rolling takeoff, so ATC may give them a clearance they wouldn't give to another airline with a slow company-mandated taxi speed and whose company doesn't allow rolling takeoffs.
Joe, I started flying, in Texas, when Southwest had three airplanes. I’ve seen a lot of Southwest flights. It’s not as bad as it was, especially when they were paid by the trip instead of the flight hour, but it still exists. Rumor is they use V-speeds when they taxi.
I've been a controller for 26 years now and this incident has left me absolutely speechless.
There is no defence for what I can only describe as one of the most horrifying displays of non-controlling you will ever see.
First, its CATIII conditions with very limited visibility. The plan to depart SWA ahead of FDX would have been a bit 'sporting' on a clear VFR day - Generally you'd not want to depart anyone...
I've been a controller for 26 years now and this incident has left me absolutely speechless.
There is no defence for what I can only describe as one of the most horrifying displays of non-controlling you will ever see.
First, its CATIII conditions with very limited visibility. The plan to depart SWA ahead of FDX would have been a bit 'sporting' on a clear VFR day - Generally you'd not want to depart anyone holding short with inbound traffic any less than 4 miles away. In full blown low vis operations its absolutely ridiculous.
Second on a CATIII approach the ILS needs to be protected because signal interference from objects within the ILS sensitive area can result in loss of accurate guidance from the localiser and glideslope. On an autoland that could cause crash because the autopilot is following that guidance all the way to touchdown. This is why CATIII holds are further back from the regular holding points.
Similarly on runways where there a mixed mode of operation extra spacing is required between arrivals to ensure that any departures in the gaps are airborne and past the end of the runway before the inbound gets to a certain distance from touchdown - which off the top of my head I think is at least 2 miles. This is why when fog hits and we go to CATIII ops the delays build up because the runway capacity goes down massively.
In this case there was zero hope of the SWA being airborne and past the end of the runway before the FDX was 2 miles from touchdown, so the moment he lined SWA up the FDX approach was compromised. You can run it tight on a visual or CATI approach but absolutely not on a CATIII.
What I found more disturbing than anything besides the gross error of judgement in his initial plan was once it became apparent that the plan was not working he simply gave up controlling at that point and allowed the aircraft to sort themselves out.
Once he identified the SWA was slow to roll (totally understandable given the low vis) it should have been blindingly obvious that this needed to be fixed immediately. SWA, cancel takeoff clearance and hold position. FDX go-around. That was the only option at that point. He would have been unable to see either of the aircraft given the reported RVR, so relying on a visual separation solution was out of the question.
Instead he did absolutely nothing which is unforgivable. Even more so given that none of the pilots could see each other and would effectively be flying blind in regards to what the other was doing. Also at that low height TCAS would be inhibited so that would not offer them any help either.
Mercifully the FDX crew seemed to be several steps ahead of everyone else and they absolutely saved this situation from being catastrophic. They should be commended and awarded for their excellent airmanship. The only thing I would say about the SWA crew is they should frankly have refused the takeoff clearance hearing landing traffic was only 3 miles out in those conditions. It was an unnecessarily risky clearance from the get go.
This incident makes me feel sick honestly. Every controller at some point in their career makes an error of judgement, which is why we have safety margins. When you make one though its critical you recognise it and then do something about it. Doing nothing really is an unforgivable sin.
This unfortunately was appalling 'controlling' from start to finish.
The initial plan was bad - it was never going to work in those conditions and then he somehow managed to make it all worse by doing nothing to fix it.
I also can't believe that the controller was apparently not relieved from position immediately because he was talking to the FDX again on its 2nd approach.
A just safety culture requires the immediate removal from position of anyone involved in an OI on a no blame basis so that the facts can be looked into and the individual involved can gather themselves.
This whole incident just boggles my mind.
Humans are being humans, what can you say.
Of all the near miss that redundancy or superior airmanship have averted a crash, it's just a little more chain of error away from full blown disaster.
It's about time to remove human (and our inherent error prone) out of the equation.
@ATC
Good analysis.
While I am totally unqualified to comment I appreciate your detailed analysis which rings true to this passenger.
I have had an inordinate number of aborted landings in Europe, often on LH. I have always understood that LH rules require a go around decision if the runway is not perfectly clear from 2 miles out. I assume the same rules would preclude landing in this situation.
By the way, now I understand why...
While I am totally unqualified to comment I appreciate your detailed analysis which rings true to this passenger.
I have had an inordinate number of aborted landings in Europe, often on LH. I have always understood that LH rules require a go around decision if the runway is not perfectly clear from 2 miles out. I assume the same rules would preclude landing in this situation.
By the way, now I understand why MXP, during rain/visibility events, limits operations to 12 per hour. Thank You!
An aircraft should not be cleared to land if another aircraft is on the runway. Add low visibility to this and, in my opinion, what the controller did was negligent.
Glad that FedEx pilot was on the ball, the tower were absent in that decision making process, I particularly liked the controller apologising and praising the FedEx crew after they cleared the runway.
Why didn't ATC use different runways for takeoff and landing during low visibility?
KAUS just completed a trial of dedicating one runway to takeoffs and one to landings. No word on whether that will ever become permanent. This incident could push us to go in that direction...
ATC need some changes.
Being slightly pedantic, the Tenerife disaster was much closer to the recent JFK incident.
What was similar to this was BER on 2022/10/22 when apparently ATC cleared Air France to land at the same time as Easyjet was cleared for takeoff.
Interestingly I only came across that when searching for the 2015 incident at the same airport when apparently Ryanair was cleared to land at the same time as Easyjet was cleared to take...
Being slightly pedantic, the Tenerife disaster was much closer to the recent JFK incident.
What was similar to this was BER on 2022/10/22 when apparently ATC cleared Air France to land at the same time as Easyjet was cleared for takeoff.
Interestingly I only came across that when searching for the 2015 incident at the same airport when apparently Ryanair was cleared to land at the same time as Easyjet was cleared to take off.
That no longer comes up on Google - it seems that either someone is planting false malicious stories about BER, or true near-misses are being hushed up.
USAir and Skywest at LAX Feb 1, 1991. 35 fatalities
Southwest blows it again.
I would have shouted “ FedEx go around “ and “Southwest abort takeoff “ if I was ATC. FEDEX is in some broke old 30 yr 767 I’m assuming ?
@SadStateofYourCountry
You’re up and early big day for an SJW. I’d be shocked if this isn’t really UANYC .
Why would you assume it’s a 30 year old 767. They’ve been receiving over 100 new build 767s for the past decade. And what does that have to do with anything?
How exactly did SWA “blow it again” when they were cleared for take off?
@Pilot737
The FEDEX pilot saw what was ensuing and told the southwest pilot to cancel the takeoff. The southwest pilot responded “negative”.
@SoSongBlue
I was under the impression 767s are out of production and would have less cutting edge instruments. The FEDEX pilot seemed like the most component one.
D3kingg
Passenger 767s are out of production however new build freighters are rolling off the production line for FedEx as we speak alongside the KC-46 for the USAF.
Had I been the captain of that Southwest flight, i would not have accepted the takeoff clearance. I would have held short. A three mile final at approach airspeed means touchdown in less than a minute. The delay would have been trivial. Kudos to the FedEx captain and his superior SA for executing that missed approach. i wonder why the Southwest captain seemed in such a hurry, and then didn't expedite his takeoff? I also...
Had I been the captain of that Southwest flight, i would not have accepted the takeoff clearance. I would have held short. A three mile final at approach airspeed means touchdown in less than a minute. The delay would have been trivial. Kudos to the FedEx captain and his superior SA for executing that missed approach. i wonder why the Southwest captain seemed in such a hurry, and then didn't expedite his takeoff? I also wonder why the controller didn't use the term "immediate" in his takeoff clearance. Also, how many precious seconds were lost reading multiple RVRs in that clearance? All that verbiage added to an "immediate" takeoff clearance would have negated the immediacy! This was way too close! Headwork, people - headwork!
By not rejecting the takeoff clearance if they weren't ready for an "immediate" - which they didn't seem to be.
I'm surprised that the ATC clearance was simply "Cleared for takeoff". As a general aviation pilot (admittedly, a long time ago), when there was incoming traffic I would sometimes get the clearance "Cleared for immediate takeoff or hold short runway 30," which means "You can take off if you can do so without delay, otherwise hold short of the runway." I would have expected a similar clearance here.
I'm not experienced with US ATC, but in the locale where I fly, ATC does not issue a landing clearance until the runway is clear. They'll wait until someone's airborne before clearing someone else to land, or they'll ensure someone's off the runway and clear of the hold short line before they'll issue the landing clearance.
I know they've told larger landing aircraft "Anticipate landing clearance on short final" when trying to get other...
I'm not experienced with US ATC, but in the locale where I fly, ATC does not issue a landing clearance until the runway is clear. They'll wait until someone's airborne before clearing someone else to land, or they'll ensure someone's off the runway and clear of the hold short line before they'll issue the landing clearance.
I know they've told larger landing aircraft "Anticipate landing clearance on short final" when trying to get other aircraft out prior to landing, but they never issue 2 clearances at once in my experience.
Definitely not the case at larger airports in the USA. Very common to get "Cleared to land, traffic will depart before arrival" or "Cleared to land #2, following the 737". In both cases you have a valid landing clearance unless cancelled. It's simply not practical to wait until the plane ahead of you lands or departs to get a clearance.
IMO its the tower period. Tower tells Southwest the Fedex is on 3 mile final. 3 miles is covered @ say 175 mph in approx 1 minute. So we're telling the Southwest plane holding short to rev-up go forward and turn onto the runway and oh by the way take-off and be far enough down the runway in one minute. Don't think so.
Immediately resorting to name calling. Must be a Democrat. This is radar data, so it is pretty reliable. There is likely more to the story. So ALL data should be evaluated as a whole. As far as your comment regarding Covid and climate goes, you obviously haven’t evaluated the whole story.
No this is not radar data this is self reported and collected ADS-B and MLAT data
Ask any maga imbecile or republican corrupt politician (pretty much all) if data is to be believed (Covid, global warming, gun death numbers) and you will have to agree that the question/comment is not so crazy...
Ur unhinged, just as bad as a maga imbecile just on the opposite end.
what's with the politics? This is an airline blog.
Once again, a pilot on one of the planes saved the error of another party. at JFK, it appears to have been an AA crew while here it was ATC.
Perhaps ATC was allowing too much traffic given the visibility. If the Fedex pilots could not see the WN aircraft was still on the runway until they were almost on top of them (sounds like some incidents that have happened at SFO), then the tower perhaps could not have seen that the WN aircraft had not departed.
The incident at SFO you refer to is the AC lining up for landing on the taxiway? Isn't that an entirely different scenario?
Comment about pax and freight sharing is silly..what's not silly is this repeat of last month at JFK, I am terrified about ATC here, are standards falling, sectors too much volume....
Again, this aspect of aviation terrifies more than my son, and we know hes a train wreck
Of course you would support allowing freight planes to keep flying. They are just like weather balloons after all.
Nobody wants to hear your inane and childish attempts at politicial humor. Please stick to the topic.
I live a few miles from Bergstrom (underneath the landing path, which is great bird watching even if this airport gets pretty boring planes). Yesterday morning around 7am I ran an errand, and as I pulled out of the driveway and headed down my street, I was shocked at how bad the visibility was, maybe 100 feet at best. Pretty unusual for this area.
"If data is to believed..." - if you can't believe data, what CAN you believe? Such a strange start to a sentence. Plus 'be' is missing but that's besides the point.
@ Lukas -- Sorry, obviously I should have phrased that differently. My point was that sometimes Flightradar24's data is a bit glitchy and inaccurate. I've updated the post to say that "if the accuracy of the data is to be believed."
Ah, OK, that makes sense. You are still missing 'be' before believed, BTW.
If anything this shows the danger of cargo and passenger aircraft sharing the same airspace. It's time to ground cargo airlines like FedEx and UPS until the ATC system can be upgraded!!!
Why is it a danger ? Both are aircraft with FAA certified pilots ? Error here was ATC and weather , nothing to do with one aircraft being a cargo plane.
Sean M.,
The fact that one of these aircraft was cargo is entirely incidental to this event. Furthermore if you ban cargo aircraft how you gonna get your stuff from Amazon? How are you going to get anything with a lithium ion battery in it to market? Ready to give us your phone?
Wow, just wow...not in a flattering way
This could possibly be the stupidest comment I've ever read on this blog. And gosh, I've read a few.
As an old pilot (not me) once said, "Son, all planes are cargo planes. Some cargo just happens to self-load..."