There’s all kinds of fraud in the miles & points world, as there’s a big underground industry of bartering rewards. While we hear about cases of rewards being stolen all the time, here’s an unusual twist on that, whereby someone managed to get someone else’s rewards credited to their frequent flyer account. I’m not sure what exactly to make of this, so I’d love to hear what others think.
In this post:
Flight somehow credited to unknown frequent flyer account
An OMAAT reader shared the following experience with me, so let me just post it in full:
I was just organizing some past flights I took last year that I hadn’t credited yet. At the time, I was still deciding where to credit them, as I mainly flew on award tickets and lacked status, but these were long haul business class tickets on CX. I noticed on my boarding passes that the frequent flyer program listed was CX, but when I logged into my account, the miles hadn’t been credited. Since I couldn’t file a claim online because it was beyond the six-month period, I decided to reach out to their WhatsApp customer service team. It was there that I was informed that the flights were credited to American.
As I rarely used AA in the past, I quickly glossed over what the agent said, assuming they had meant “an American airline,” so I logged into my AS account. I found no points there. Then, I reread the message and tried logging into my AA account, and discovered it was locked. It turns out the account was locked since 2022, because someone tried to log in. I never used AA, so I must have missed the email notification and didn’t report the fraud then. However, I also managed to retrieve my AA number.
I reached out to CX to confirm if the agent meant AS or AA, and she said AA, American Airlines. I then confirmed if it was my AA number which I provided to review and they said no, it was credited to [different account number]. I then entered that number into AA’s password reset area and used my name, since they would’ve needed my name to credit the miles. Sure enough, it was associated with a different email address using a bizarre domain. I also did a WHOIS search, which showed that the domain was registered in Beijing last year.
I then called AA and they said it’s bizarre and they’ve never seen a case like this before and they will open a case with Fraud. Fraud then said they need to unlock my account first before they can move onto the next investigation.
What is also surprising is that I listed my CX FFP numbers before and during check-in, my boarding passes reflect this, and the return journeys were nearly three weeks long. I’m not sure how they could have modified the FFP details after flying. The agent at CX was also really not helpful and dismissive about potential fraud and compromised data on their end.
Just in case that isn’t clear (or if you just want the summary), let me simplify it as much as possible. This person had their Cathay Pacific frequent flyer on a reservation, but the flight never credited to the account (which he only found out about later, while “auditing” his accounts). He was informed that the flight was credited to American AAdvantage, which he never requested, and on top of that, it wasn’t the number he uses with the program.
Furthermore, below is the message he received on American’s website when he tried to reset the password for the account this was reportedly credited to, which had the @qmdfcd.com domain. 
And then when he looked up that domain, it was linked to being registered in Beijing, China.
Was this an inside job, or how else do you explain this?
While frequent flyer miles are stolen all the time, this is a specific type of fraud I’ve never heard of before. A few thoughts:
- This traveler had a frequent flyer number on the account, and somehow that was switched between check-in and when the flight took place (or something)
- Unless there was some very strange glitch, the flight could only be credited to an account with a matching name, meaning that someone must have set up an American AAdvantage account in this person’s name, with the intent of then quickly redeeming the miles out of that account
- For someone to know the name of the traveler, have access to the ticket, etc., would’ve required either quite the data breach, an inside job, or something along those lines
This is a much more complex and niche scheme than just managing to hack into a frequent flyer account, and then redeeming those miles for someone else for a last minute ticket. It also seems to greatly limit the potential upside, since you’re only racking up (likely) under 10,000 miles this way, give or take, depending on the total distance flown, etc. That’s enough to maybe fly one person on a short haul economy flight within the United States, which also isn’t exactly the target for frequent flyer fraud.
I’m curious if anyone has any theories as to what could explain all of this. Most frequent flyer program fraud is repeated, so I imagine this isn’t a one time thing. I still don’t understand exactly how this could happen, though.
Bottom line
A traveler booked a Cathay Pacific business class ticket and intended to credit the flight to Cathay Pacific, only to find that the flight never posted. He later discovered that the flight was credited to American AAdvantage, but not even to his account (which he never provided), but instead, to an account registered to a @qmdfcd.com domain. Presumably that account was still made in his name, or else the flight wouldn’t have credited.
There’s clearly some fraud here, but I’m struggling to make sense of how this could be possible. For that matter, this seems like one of the fraudulent mileage schemes that’s highest risk and lowest reward.
What do you make of this mileage credit fraud scheme?
It's absolutely insane that the airlines don't actually do anything about it. I'm guessing the "inside job" for stealing miles is probably at a lower-tier, like the check-in agent or something. Why would management, or IT, etc. some department like that not try to follow up? Surely there is an audit trail for each API call / modification to FFP or the ticket in general; which should be traced back to the authorization check and...
It's absolutely insane that the airlines don't actually do anything about it. I'm guessing the "inside job" for stealing miles is probably at a lower-tier, like the check-in agent or something. Why would management, or IT, etc. some department like that not try to follow up? Surely there is an audit trail for each API call / modification to FFP or the ticket in general; which should be traced back to the authorization check and then trivially identify the source?!
I'm going to E-Mail Cathay and ask for a formal comment, let's see.
I recently experienced the same flying SQ EWR-SIN-BKK. Hadn’t decided which program to credit, left it blank. Received printed BPs at the airport, all fine. When I went to credit a few months later, SQ said it was already credited to VA, an account I never created. They ultimately credited the miles to my SQ account, but when I asked them to investigate the transaction, they said no wrongdoing had been found and stopped replying to my messages.
Passenger in this case claimed FFPs changed after boarding passes issued. Given CX's changes last Aug and Nov to lock the FFP at the check-in stage, this seems to suggest there's some insider involvement - very likely the check in agent - in this case.
Lucky, do you have any inside contact with CX? This case is really interesting, given the anti-boarding pass FFP fraud steps they put up has been bypassed.
@Lucky,
If the ticket was booked through a travel agent who has access to the PNR, or if there was a "collaborator" within CX that could access the PNR, the FF number can be changed right after boarding but before the flight departs, on a segment-specific basis. That way, the miles will go to the new account, and the traveller would not notice anything wrong on the boarding pass. CX does limit retro-claim period...
@Lucky,
If the ticket was booked through a travel agent who has access to the PNR, or if there was a "collaborator" within CX that could access the PNR, the FF number can be changed right after boarding but before the flight departs, on a segment-specific basis. That way, the miles will go to the new account, and the traveller would not notice anything wrong on the boarding pass. CX does limit retro-claim period to 6 months, so even if the miles didn't go elsewhere, the traveller would not be eligible for retro-claim to CX account, either.
Has been happening for about a year with CX https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/cathay-pacific-cathay/2204815-someone-added-someone-s-frequent-flyer-my-booking.html , though the programs used were QF Frequent Flyer and Q Avios, dunno why AA is used this time
CX's recent changes not to allow FFP changes 1) online for non-logged-in accounts, 2) under any circumstances after check-in – while having the effect of inconveniencing those of us who with to credit to one programme while benefiting from another – are almost certainly in response to this fraud on a larger scale.
The solution is that airlines should not allow just any employee to modify the FF field in a reservation. Only the passenger should be able to do that either by logging into their account, or calling customer service and being verified. I've seen some airlines allow FF number changes simply by accessing the reservation with name and PNR which are on boarding passes and luggage tags, so that needs to stop. Really, allowing access to...
The solution is that airlines should not allow just any employee to modify the FF field in a reservation. Only the passenger should be able to do that either by logging into their account, or calling customer service and being verified. I've seen some airlines allow FF number changes simply by accessing the reservation with name and PNR which are on boarding passes and luggage tags, so that needs to stop. Really, allowing access to a reservation at all with just name and PNR is a huge security flaw that needs to be closed.
Quite easy to explain this. STOP POSTING YOUR BOARDING PASSES AND RESERVATIONS ON SOCIAL MEDIA! Fraudsters skim Instagram and Facebook for idiots who publish their reservation details; then they open a frequent flyer account in their name and credit/redeem these miles. It's also a well-known tactic with check-in agents, especially for travelers who don't present their own FFN at the counter.
CX stopped people from changing FFPs after obtaining their boarding passes since August 2025, so even if I sent you boarding pass pic, and even if I entered no FFP when I checked in, you can’t add a FFP.
This kind of fraud has been happening for at least 15-20 years, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. Check-in staff flag high value business class tickets and set up new accounts in that passenger name, sometimes doing the switch even after boarding passes are printed so the passenger doesn't suspect anything. The miles then credit and are spent immediately on high value shorthaul tickets (yes, these are incredibly profitable for last minute bookings) and...
This kind of fraud has been happening for at least 15-20 years, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. Check-in staff flag high value business class tickets and set up new accounts in that passenger name, sometimes doing the switch even after boarding passes are printed so the passenger doesn't suspect anything. The miles then credit and are spent immediately on high value shorthaul tickets (yes, these are incredibly profitable for last minute bookings) and the passenger doesn't even realise there is anything fishy until its too late.
This has been happening to me for YEARS with Saudia and Flying Blue. Everyone told me I am getting it wrong, but I insisted, and now I know I have been right all along. Every time I fly business with Saudia on longhaul routes, that are supposed to generate insane amounts of XP and points, I double and triple check that my Flying Blue account is on booking and boarding passes. After flying, nothing happens...
This has been happening to me for YEARS with Saudia and Flying Blue. Everyone told me I am getting it wrong, but I insisted, and now I know I have been right all along. Every time I fly business with Saudia on longhaul routes, that are supposed to generate insane amounts of XP and points, I double and triple check that my Flying Blue account is on booking and boarding passes. After flying, nothing happens inside Flying Blue. After some time, support tells me "flights have been credited to a different account on my name". Sometimes it was a new flying blue account that I never created. Sometimes it was a Saudia account that I also never created.
It is someone inside the airline. Stuff inside Saudia is doing this for years on a massive scale. I could not prove it, but I always knew this. It came to a point when I double check the correct FFP number on EVERY step before boarding - including lounge, and the gate itself. Everywhere I repeat that I will start a police investigation if somehow the number changes after I take the flight. The last time credited normally, for the first time in 3 years and tens of flights with them.
If you want to know more you can contact me, Ben.
The sine qua non solution when any scam becomes suspect , is to Cancel All Miles , anywhere . Otherwise , the scammer can track you backwards . Especially this one .
The same happened to QR when they had a huge data breach. Scammers used info from passengers without a FFP attached to their booking to create one under their name and then move the Avios around.
This happened to me on a QR flight after checking in in Chennai. My AA account was displayed on the boarding pass, miles never credited, follow-up with Qatar indicated they ended up on a Qantas account that I had no control over. Took almost 5 months to get everything resolved - no one wanted to take ownership
"This domain is connected to Beijing, China" ... h'welp. Good luck with that one!
(That's what Xi said...)
The Only solution is to immediately Cancel All Miles to escape the danger .