KLM Flight Diverts Over Atlantic After Former CEO's Power Bank Starts Cabin Fire

Same

There is no blanket ban, some airlines have banned the use of powerbanks on their own accord, and some regulators have banned it for the airlines they regulate. So it could be a matter of what airlines you fly.

The other part is that the ban is just an announcement with all the other ones, so it can be missed.

Since beginning of the year a lot of airlines, including KLM, forbid power banks to be used during flight, so this is not news.

It depends where you live/fly.

- From 01 Jan 2027, IATA and ICAO rules strongly discourage (but don't prohibit) power bank use to recharge portable electronic devices in flight. IATA announced this changed advisory in March 2026. Many airlines and several countries changed their rules after March 2026 and now fully prohibit power bank use onboard.

- Most European, Middle Eastern and Asian airlines by now prohibit the use of power banks to charge devices. This includes Air France/KLM (as in this post), ANA, JAL, Korean Air, Lufthansa Group, Emirates, Etihad, EVA, easyjet, Cathay, Singapore Airlines, Air China, China Southern, Virgin, Qantas, etc.

- Major US airlines and British Airways currently allow use during the cruise phase of a flight, but rely on flight attendant supervision, requiring flight attendants to monitor that passengers don't use power banks to charge devices unattended, while sleeping or during taxi, take-off and landing. Under US law and FAA rules, passengers have to follow flight attendant orders related to safety, aircraft operations, stowage, passenger handling, and regulatory compliance.

Basically, it seems like US airlines and BA ask flight attendants to babysit their passengers, while other airlines expect passengers to listen to the rules and behave responsibly.

They clearly announce this on board after take off. And also before landing. What an ignorant man this former CEO and former Minister of Transport is. Really too bad he is getting off so lightly.

Because most other devices such as smartphones present lower stored energy, superior thermal tracking, and higher manufacturing consistency, airlines tolerate charging them directly while prohibiting power bank recharging. For power bank production, barrier of entry is low, most are no-name and battery chemistry/electric quality is low.

Lithium vs no lithium

Dang it, I messed up the quote for this context:

*Rules for thee but not for me. 🙂

Noooooo not in checked bags ever!!!!

Power banks made by well known manufacturers have reliable battery chemistry, bms, cut offs and are designed to sustain the occasional knock. It’s the cheap Chinese products that one should be weary of.

Plus the cost of fixing that seat. I don't think they would be able to continue to use that seat as it and so they'll need to fix it so that people can sit there!

No, this counts as extraordinary circumstance for the airline so no compensation from EU261/04

That's why he's on fire during a power (bank) trip?

He just wants the attention he deserved.

KLM will reimburse all passengers, for delay, meals, hotels and other misc charges.
THANK YOU EU 261.

We have reached out to Ms Rintel as follows

Subject: Formal escalation – KL735 Amsterdam to Curaçao, 17 September 2026 – Article 5(3) compensation decision

Dear Ms Rintel,

I am writing to formally escalate our complaint concerning KL735 from Amsterdam to Curaçao on 17 September 2026 and KLM’s decision to refuse compensation on the basis of “extraordinary circumstances”.

Existing KLM case references: C-12001962 and C-11998681

This is a joint complaint from:

Mandy Wright – seat 37F
Tom Wright – seat 37G
Donna Blackwell – seat 1G
Ian Blackwell – seat 1D

I am coordinating this complaint on behalf of all four passengers, with their agreement.

I am a Health and Safety Business Partner working within a UK Government department. I mention this because the central issue is not simply that a power bank entered thermal runaway. It is whether a known safety risk, subject to an explicit KLM control, was actively monitored and enforced, whether there was a reasonable opportunity to intervene, and whether KLM subsequently took all reasonable measures to minimise the consequences.

Before KLM relies on Article 5(3) of Regulation EC261, we are asking KLM to demonstrate that the legal test has been satisfied — not simply repeat the words “extraordinary circumstances”.

Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 allows an airline to avoid compensation only where it can establish that the disruption resulted from extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken.

Article 5(3) places the burden on KLM to demonstrate not only that the initial event amounted to an extraordinary circumstance, but also that the resulting disruption could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken.

Official EU source: Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 – EUR-Lex

The Court of Justice has gone further and said the airline must show the event was both:

* not inherent in the normal activity of the airline; and
* outside the airline’s actual control.

Those two conditions are cumulative.

Official EU source: CJEU Case C-74/19 – passenger conduct and reasonable measures

A known risk and an explicit KLM control

Passengers were specifically instructed before departure that power banks were not to be used during the flight.

KLM’s own published policy is unequivocal: power banks must not be used or charged onboard.

Donna and Ian Blackwell were seated alongside Mr Camiel Eurlings and witnessed the circumstances immediately before, during and after the incident first-hand.

They report that his laptop, telephone and power bank were visible and being used during the flight. They did not observe cabin crew challenging the prohibited power-bank use before the device entered thermal runaway.

They also report that cabin crew and the Captain had several face-to-face conversations with Mr Eurlings before take-off. The equipment he had with him was therefore plainly present in his seating area.

We have photographs taken immediately after the incident which clearly show a power lead still plugged into the power-bank device. This physical evidence is consistent with and corroborates Donna and Ian’s first-hand account that the power bank had been connected and in use before the thermal-runaway event.

We ask KLM to consider that photographic evidence alongside the witness accounts and its own investigation into the device.

That raises a fundamental safety question.

EASA cabin-crew guidance expressly identifies surveillance of the cabin, management and observation of passengers, and observation of the use of portable electronic devices during flight as part of cabin-crew duties.

We fully accept that cabin crew cannot observe every passenger every second. That is not what we are suggesting.

However, Mr Eurlings was not a passenger with whom the crew had had no interaction. Donna and Ian report that the Captain and cabin crew had several face-to-face conversations with him before take-off, during which his laptop, telephone and other equipment were plainly visible.

This demonstrates an existing level of direct interaction and repeated opportunity for observation.

We are not suggesting that Mr Eurlings should have been monitored differently because he is a former KLM CEO or a well-known individual. The same safety rules should apply regardless of a passenger’s status.

What we are asking is why, despite that direct interaction and the subsequent visible use of his laptop, telephone and power bank, the prohibited power-bank use was apparently not identified and challenged before the device entered thermal runaway.

In those circumstances, it is entirely reasonable to ask what active monitoring took place, whether cabin crew observed the equipment during the flight, whether they passed or attended the seating area while it was being used, and whether there was an opportunity to intervene.

Announcing a safety control and actively monitoring and enforcing compliance with that control are not the same thing.

Official EASA source: EASA cabin-crew guidance

Mr Eurlings is a former Chief Executive of KLM. In our view, he should have understood better than most passengers the significance of complying with an explicit safety instruction concerning a recognised lithium-battery fire risk.

His former position is not, however, the basis of our claim. The fundamental issue is whether an observable breach of KLM’s own safety control was allowed to continue unchecked.

The seriousness of the incident

This was not a minor battery malfunction.

Donna and Ian were sitting alongside the incident when the power bank entered thermal runaway. There was significant heat, smoke and physical damage.

They recall cabin crew putting cloths over their own mouths and noses, explaining that the fumes were toxic and advising passengers to do the same.

The photographs taken afterwards demonstrate the extent of the damage in the immediate seating area.

The fact that the crew successfully contained the incident does not diminish its seriousness.

Witnessing an onboard lithium-battery fire at close quarters, seeing the resulting damage, being warned about potentially harmful fumes and then remaining onboard without knowing what would happen next had a significant psychological impact on us.

This was not simply a delayed flight. We had witnessed a genuine aviation safety incident.

What happened after the thermal runaway?

Our recollection is that the incident occurred while the aircraft was still over or around the UK.

Ian recalls it being closer to 90 minutes before the aircraft turned back.

Rather than rely on passenger recollection, KLM holds the operational records capable of establishing the timeline precisely.

We therefore ask KLM to provide the recorded time of the thermal-runaway event, when the Captain began considering the available options, when the decision to return was made and when that decision was communicated to passengers.

We also want to understand what happened during that period.

What safety and operational assessments were undertaken? What diversion or landing options were considered? Why did the aircraft continue before turning back? Why was Amsterdam ultimately selected?

We have seen speculation that returning a damaged aircraft to its home base can have operational or financial advantages. We are not asserting that this influenced KLM’s decision.

We are asking KLM to confirm whether aircraft recovery, maintenance, positioning, operational or commercial considerations formed any part of that decision and to provide the actual safety and operational reasoning for returning specifically to Amsterdam.

Conduct following the incident

Donna and Ian can also provide first-hand evidence regarding what happened afterwards.

They report hearing Mr Eurlings say words to the effect that he would be known as a “see you next Tuesday” if the aircraft was turned around because of him. This is presented specifically as witness evidence.

Following the incident, Donna Blackwell states that she personally approached Mr Eurlings on two occasions and asked him to stop using his devices, as he continued to use them despite what had just occurred.

Donna states that she did not observe cabin crew approaching or challenging him regarding that continued behaviour. Her intervention subsequently drew the attention of a flight attendant.

These points demonstrate why KLM should take statements directly from the passengers seated alongside the incident before reaching a definitive conclusion that the circumstances were wholly outside its control.

The Article 5(3) legal test

Regulation EC261 does not allow an airline simply to describe an event as extraordinary and end the analysis.

Article 5(3) requires the operating carrier to establish that extraordinary circumstances existed and that the disruption could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken.

The Court of Justice has also held, in the context of passenger behaviour, that conduct cannot simply be treated as outside the carrier’s actual control where the carrier contributed to the occurrence or was in a position to anticipate the behaviour and take appropriate measures in light of warning signs.

That is why the first-hand evidence concerning visible prohibited power-bank use, the photographic evidence of the connected power lead, and the potential opportunities for intervention require proper investigation.

There is then a separate legal question concerning what KLM did afterwards.

We did not reach Curaçao until the following day. EU case law makes clear that merely placing passengers on an airline’s own next flight will not necessarily constitute all reasonable measures where earlier direct or indirect rerouting — including with another airline — was reasonably available.

We therefore require KLM to establish what alternative rerouting was investigated and why our substantial delay could not have been reduced.

KLM’s own right of redress

There is a further point we ask KLM to address.

If KLM’s position is that this disruption arose solely from the actions of one passenger who failed to comply with an explicit KLM safety instruction, then KLM itself has remedies available against that passenger.

KLM’s own Conditions of Carriage provide for action where passenger behaviour breaches onboard safety requirements, including the ability in appropriate circumstances to take legal action and claim damages.

Furthermore, Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 expressly preserves KLM’s right to seek compensation from any person, including a third party, after fulfilling its obligations to passengers under the Regulation.

In this case, the passenger concerned was a former Chief Executive of KLM. He should have understood better than most passengers the importance of complying with an expressly communicated safety instruction concerning a recognised lithium-battery fire risk.

If KLM maintains that his conduct caused this disruption, we question why the financial consequences should simply be left with the innocent passengers affected by it.

Any right KLM has to recover its own losses from the person it considers responsible is a separate matter between KLM and that individual. It does not, in itself, establish that KLM is entitled to refuse our compensation under Article 5(3).

We therefore ask KLM to explain how it reconciles its reliance on the actions of this passenger to deny compensation with the fact that EU261 expressly preserves KLM’s right of redress against a responsible third party after meeting its obligations to passengers.

Official sources:
KLM General Conditions of Carriage – passenger conduct and damages
https://www.klm.com/information/legal/conditions-carriage

Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 – Article 13, Right of Redress
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32004R0261

The original KLM decision

We are also extremely concerned that KLM’s original rejection under case C-12001962 referred to a Madrid-to-Madrid flight and adverse weather.

Neither had anything whatsoever to do with KL735.

Our flight was Amsterdam to Curaçao, and the disruption followed the onboard power-bank incident.

A decision containing both the wrong route and the wrong cause of disruption raises an obvious question as to whether our claim was ever properly assessed against the actual facts before compensation was refused.

What we are asking KLM to do

We ask KLM to:

1. Reopen and properly reassess cases C-12001962 and C-11998681 using the correct facts of KL735.
2. Obtain formal accounts from Donna Blackwell (1G) and Ian Blackwell (1D), who were seated alongside the incident.
3. Consider the photographic evidence showing the power lead plugged into the power-bank device alongside those first-hand witness accounts.
4. Establish whether cabin crew observed the power bank, laptop and telephone, whether crew passed or attended that seating area and whether any intervention occurred.
5. Explain what active monitoring and enforcement of KLM’s power-bank prohibition took place.
6. Provide the accurate operational timeline from the thermal runaway to the decision to return to Amsterdam and explain what occurred during the approximately 90-minute period recalled by a witness.
7. Explain what diversion or landing alternatives were considered and why Amsterdam was selected.
8. Confirm whether aircraft recovery, maintenance, positioning, operational or commercial considerations formed any part of that decision.
9. Explain what alternative rerouting was considered after the aircraft returned to Amsterdam, including flights operated by other carriers.
10. Demonstrate with evidence how KLM says the complete Article 5(3) test is satisfied.
11. Confirm how KLM has considered its own rights of redress against the passenger whose conduct it says caused the disruption, including Article 13 of Regulation EC261, rather than treating the financial consequences as falling solely upon the affected passengers.
12. If KLM cannot establish that exemption, pay the applicable statutory compensation of €600 per eligible passenger — €2,400 for the four passengers making this complaint.
13. Consider an appropriate goodwill response in recognition of the wider consequences of this incident.

All four of us reached Curaçao approximately a day later than planned. The impact cannot be measured solely in hours.

We experienced an onboard lithium-battery fire, hazardous fumes, uncertainty over the safety and continuation of the flight, the return to Amsterdam, an unexpected overnight stay and the need to undertake the journey again the following day.

For Mandy, delayed baggage subsequently compounded the disruption.

The experience was physically exhausting and psychologically distressing, and it inevitably affected the beginning of what should have been a relaxing holiday.

My lost baggage and paid-seat reimbursement issues are being dealt with separately and are not being duplicated within this complaint.

Yours sincerely,

Mandy Wright
Coordinating on behalf of:

Mandy Wright – 37F
Tom Wright – 37G
Donna Blackwell – 1G
Ian Blackwell – 1D

Subject: Formal escalation – Case C-12001962 – KL735 Amsterdam to Curaçao, 17 September 2026 – Article 5(3) compensation decision

Dear Ms Rintel,

I am writing to formally escalate our complaint concerning KL735 from Amsterdam to Curaçao on 17 September 2026 and KLM’s decision to refuse compensation on the basis of “extraordinary circumstances”.

Existing KLM case reference: C-12001962 and C-11998681

This is a joint complaint from:

Mandy Wright – seat 37F
Tom Wright – seat 37G
Donna Blackwell – seat 1G
Ian Blackwell – seat 1D

I am coordinating this complaint on behalf of all four passengers, with their agreement.

I am a Health and Safety Business Partner working within a UK Government department. I mention this because the central issue is not simply that a power bank entered thermal runaway. It is whether a known safety risk, subject to an explicit KLM control, was actively monitored and enforced, whether there was a reasonable opportunity to intervene, and whether KLM subsequently took all reasonable measures to minimise the consequences.

Before KLM relies on Article 5(3) of Regulation EC261, we are asking KLM to demonstrate that the legal test has been satisfied — not simply repeat the words “extraordinary circumstances”.

Article 5(3) is the part of EU261 ( that lets an airline avoid paying compensation only if it can prove two things:

1. the disruption was caused by extraordinary circumstances, and
2. those circumstances could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken.

Article 5(3) places the burden on KLM to demonstrate not only that the initial event amounted to an extraordinary circumstance, but also that the resulting disruption could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken.

CJEU explanation of Article 5(3) and “all reasonable measures”⁠

The Court of Justice has gone further and said the airline must show the event was both:

* not inherent in the normal activity of the airline, and
* outside the airline’s actual control.
Those two conditions are cumulative.

A known risk and an explicit KLM control

Passengers were specifically instructed before departure that power banks were not to be used during the flight.

KLM’s own published policy is unequivocal: power banks must not be used or charged onboard.

Donna and Ian Blackwell were seated alongside Mr Camiel Eurlings and witnessed the circumstances immediately before, during and after the incident first-hand.

They report that his laptop, telephone and power bank were visible and being used during the flight. They did not observe cabin crew challenging the prohibited power-bank use before the device entered thermal runaway.

They also report that cabin crew and the Captain had several face-to-face conversations with Mr Eurlings before take-off. The equipment he had with him was therefore plainly present in his seating area.

We also hold photographs taken immediately after the incident which show a power lead still plugged into the power-bank device and is evidence that the power bank was connected and being used.

We ask KLM to consider that photographic evidence alongside the witness accounts and its own investigation into the device.

That raises a fundamental safety question.

EASA cabin-crew guidance expressly identifies surveillance of the cabin, management and observation of passengers, and observation of the use of portable electronic devices during flight as part of cabin-crew duties.

We fully accept that cabin crew cannot observe every passenger every second. That is not what we are suggesting.

However, Mr Eurlings was not a passenger with whom the crew had had no interaction. Donna and Ian report that the Captain and cabin crew had several face-to-face conversations with him before take-off, during which his laptop, telephone and other equipment were plainly visible.

This demonstrates an existing level of direct interaction and repeated opportunity for observation.

We are not suggesting that Mr Eurlings should have been monitored differently because he is a former KLM CEO or a well-known individual. The same safety rules should apply regardless of a passenger’s status.

What we are asking is why, despite that direct interaction and the subsequent visible use of his laptop, telephone and power bank, the prohibited power-bank use was apparently not identified and challenged before the device entered thermal runaway.

In those circumstances, it is entirely reasonable to ask what active monitoring took place, whether cabin crew observed the equipment during the flight, whether they passed or attended the seating area while it was being used, and whether there was an opportunity to intervene.

Announcing a safety control and actively monitoring and enforcing compliance with that control are not the same thing.

Announcing a safety control and actively monitoring and enforcing compliance with that control are not the same thing.

Official EASA source: EASA cabin-crew guidance⁠

Mr Eurlings is a former Chief Executive of KLM. In our view, he should have understood better than most passengers the significance of complying with an explicit safety instruction concerning a recognised lithium-battery fire risk.

His former position is not, however, the basis of our claim. The fundamental issue is whether an observable breach of KLM’s own safety control was allowed to continue unchecked.

The seriousness of the incident

This was not a minor battery malfunction.

Donna and Ian were sitting alongside the incident when the power bank entered thermal runaway. There was significant heat, smoke and physical damage.

They recall cabin crew putting cloths over their own mouths and noses, explaining that the fumes were toxic and advising passengers to do the same.

The photographs taken afterwards demonstrate the extent of the damage in the immediate seating area.

The fact that the crew successfully contained the incident does not diminish its seriousness.

Witnessing an onboard lithium-battery fire at close quarters, seeing the resulting damage, being warned about potentially harmful fumes and then remaining onboard without knowing what would happen next had a significant psychological impact on us.

This was not simply a delayed flight. We had witnessed a genuine aviation safety incident.

What happened after the thermal runaway?

Our recollection is that the incident occurred while the aircraft was still over or around the UK.

Ian recalls it being closer to 90 minutes before the aircraft turned back.

Rather than rely on passenger recollection, KLM holds the operational records capable of establishing the timeline precisely.

We therefore ask KLM to provide the recorded time of the thermal-runaway event, when the Captain began considering the available options, when the decision to return was made and when that decision was communicated to passengers.

We also want to understand what happened during that period.

What safety and operational assessments were undertaken? What diversion or landing options were considered? Why did the aircraft continue before turning back? Why was Amsterdam ultimately selected?

We have seen speculation that returning a damaged aircraft to its home base can have operational or financial advantages. We are not asserting that this influenced KLM’s decision.

We are asking KLM to confirm whether aircraft recovery, maintenance, positioning, operational or commercial considerations formed any part of that decision and to provide the actual safety and operational reasoning for returning specifically to Amsterdam.

Conduct following the incident

Donna and Ian can also provide first-hand evidence regarding what happened afterwards.

They report hearing Mr Eurlings say words to the effect that he would be known as a “see you next Tuesday” if the aircraft was turned around because of him. This is presented specifically as witness evidence.

Following the incident, Donna Blackwell states that she personally approached Mr Eurlings on two occasions and asked him to stop using his devices, as he continued to use them despite what had just occurred.

Donna states that she did not observe cabin crew approaching or challenging him regarding that continued behaviour. Her intervention subsequently drew the attention of a flight attendant.

These points demonstrate why KLM should take statements directly from the passengers seated alongside the incident before reaching a definitive conclusion that the circumstances were wholly outside its control.

The Article 5(3) legal test

Regulation EC261 does not allow an airline simply to describe an event as extraordinary and end the analysis.

Article 5(3) requires the operating carrier to establish that extraordinary circumstances existed and that the disruption could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken.

The Court of Justice has also held, in the context of passenger behaviour, that conduct cannot simply be treated as outside the carrier’s actual control where the carrier contributed to the occurrence or was in a position to anticipate the behaviour and take appropriate measures in light of warning signs.

That is why the first-hand evidence concerning visible prohibited power-bank use, the photographic evidence of the connected power lead, and the potential opportunities for intervention require proper investigation.

There is then a separate legal question concerning what KLM did afterwards.

We did not reach Curaçao until the following day. EU case law makes clear that merely placing passengers on an airline’s own next flight will not necessarily constitute all reasonable measures where earlier direct or indirect rerouting — including with another airline — was reasonably available.

We therefore require KLM to establish what alternative rerouting was investigated and why our substantial delay could not have been reduced.

The original KLM decision

We are also extremely concerned that KLM’s original rejection under case C-12001962 referred to a Madrid-to-Madrid flight and adverse weather.

Neither had anything whatsoever to do with KL735.

Our flight was Amsterdam to Curaçao, and the disruption followed the onboard power-bank incident.

A decision containing both the wrong route and the wrong cause of disruption raises an obvious question as to whether our claim was ever properly assessed against the actual facts before compensation was refused.

What we are asking KLM to do

We ask KLM to:

1. Reopen and properly reassess case C-12001962 using the correct facts of KL735.
2. Reopen and properly reassess case C-11998681
3. Obtain formal accounts from Donna Blackwell (1G) and Ian Blackwell (1D), who were seated alongside the incident.
4. Consider the photographic evidence showing the power lead plugged into the power-bank device alongside those first-hand witness accounts.
5. Establish whether cabin crew observed the power bank, laptop and telephone, whether crew passed or attended that seating area and whether any intervention occurred.
6. Explain what active monitoring and enforcement of KLM’s power-bank prohibition took place.
7. Provide the accurate operational timeline from the thermal runaway to the decision to return to Amsterdam and explain what occurred during the approximately 90-minute period recalled by a witness.
8. Explain what diversion or landing alternatives were considered and why Amsterdam was selected.
9. Confirm whether aircraft recovery, maintenance, positioning, operational or commercial considerations formed any part of that decision.
10. Explain what alternative rerouting was considered after the aircraft returned to Amsterdam, including flights operated by other carriers.
11. Demonstrate with evidence how KLM says the complete Article 5(3) test is satisfied.
12. If KLM cannot establish that exemption, pay the applicable statutory compensation of €600 per eligible passenger — €2,400 for the four passengers making this complaint.
13. Consider an appropriate goodwill response in recognition of the wider consequences of this incident.

This was a 10-day holiday. We all lost approximately a full day, around 10% of the holiday, simply reaching Curaçao. But the impact cannot be measured solely in hours.

We experienced an onboard lithium-battery fire, hazardous fumes, uncertainty over the safety and continuation of the flight, the return to Amsterdam, an unexpected overnight stay and then had to undertake the journey again the following day. Delayed baggage subsequently added further disruption.

The experience was physically exhausting and psychologically distressing, and it inevitably affected the beginning of what should have been a relaxing holiday.

My lost baggage and paid-seat reimbursement issues are being dealt with separately and are not being duplicated within this complaint.

Given the seriousness of the safety issues raised, the first-hand witness evidence available and the fact that our previous compensation decision appears to have been based on incorrect flight information, we ask KLM to acknowledge this escalation within five working days and provide a substantive response within 14 calendar days.

We are not seeking another standard customer-service response or a repetition of the phrase “extraordinary circumstances”. We expect the specific questions raised above to be addressed and KLM’s Article 5(3) position to be supported by the relevant facts and evidence.

If we do not receive a satisfactory substantive response within that timeframe, we will consider the matter unresolved and proceed with the appropriate next stages, including formal aviation-safety escalation to the relevant Dutch authorities and further action in relation to our EU261 compensation claims.

We would prefer to resolve this directly with KLM and therefore hope that this senior-level escalation will now receive the detailed consideration it warrants.

Yours sincerely,

Mandy Wright
Coordinating on behalf of:

Mandy Wright – 37F
Tom Wright – 37G
Donna Blackwell – 1G
Ian Blackwell – 1D