Several weeks ago, a LATAM jet departing Italy for Brazil suffered a tail strike on takeoff, in what can only be described as a rather strange incident, as reported by The Aviation Herald. Investigators in Italy have now released their preliminary report as to what happened, and goodness, the crew really messed this one up…
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LATAM 777 returns to Milan following takeoff tail strike
This incident happened on Tuesday, July 9, 2024, and involves LATAM flight LA8073, scheduled to fly from Milan, Italy (MXP), to Sao Paulo, Brazil (GRU). The flight was operated by an 11-year-old Boeing 777-300ER with the registration code PT-MUG.
At 1:26PM local time, the aircraft took off from Milan Malpensa Airport’s runway 35L. However, while rotating, the jet struck its tail on the runway. It didn’t just do that for a moment, but rather, runway scrapings were identified for a distance of 723 meters(!!!).
The aircraft safely became airborne, and stopped its climb at 5,000 feet. It then entered a holding pattern, then climbed to 6,000 feet, and then started dumping fuel, totaling 72,000 kg. Once at a safe landing weight, the aircraft returned to Milan Malpensa Airport roughly 75 minutes after it first departed.
Below you can see a video of the takeoff with the tail strike. The amount of smoke… yow!
Then below are some pictures of the aftermath from the incident.
The flight ended up being canceled. Five days after the incident, on July 14, 2024, the jet was ferried to Sao Paulo without passengers. It hasn’t flown since, so it has now been grounded in Brazil for several weeks.
What caused this unusual tail strike incident
With the number of flights that operate around the globe, of course things are going to go wrong sometimes. Tail strikes happen every so often, though it’s more common to see them during landing than takeoff. That’s because there’s a lot more variability with a landing than a takeoff.
That’s because landing is typically a more manual process. Meanwhile for takeoff, pilots just enter all the flight details into the flight management system (the aircraft’s weight, weather conditions, etc.), and then they’re told at what speed they should take off. It’s supposed to be pretty straightforward, assuming nothing goes wrong.
Italy’s ANSV (National Agency for the Safety of Flight) has now released its preliminary findings from this incident, and my gosh, unfortunately this mistake is as basic as it could possibly be. Long story short, the pilots programmed the flight management system incorrectly. It appears that they accidentally entered the the aircraft’s zero fuel weight (or something close to it) rather than the actual takeoff weight, when calculating the takeoff speed.
How big was the discrepancy?
- Based on how the computer was programmed, they were given a V1 (decision speed) of 145 knots, a VR (rotation speed) of 149 knots, and a V2 (takeoff safety speed) of 156 knots
- Based on the correct calculations that were carried out during the investigation, they should have had a V1 of 173 knots, a VR of 181 knots, and a V2 of 186 knots
The pilots started rotating the jet at 153 knots, and by the time the aircraft accelerated to 166 knots, it had a pitch of 8.2 degrees, leading to a tail strike. So yeah, the pilots just messed up the numbers. This is a pretty major mistake — it’s bad enough for this to be programmed in the first place, but the fact that none of the pilots noticed this mistake makes it even worse.
What’s also quite noteworthy is that this was an extremely experienced flight deck crew, with three captains — there was an instructor captain sitting in the right seat (who was flying this segment), a captain-in-training sitting in the left seat, and a relief captain sitting in the jump seat.
You would think that having an instructor captain flying the jet would offer the safest flying imaginable, yet it’s amazing how frequently accidents involve very senior crews. One can’t help but wonder if the cockpit dynamic was a factor here, with the captain-in-training not wanting to question the instructor captain.
Based on my understanding, it should’ve been obvious to the pilots that a fully loaded 777 taking off on a hot day wouldn’t have these takeoff parameters. Yet despite three captains in the cockpit, no one even took a second to question if the numbers were right.
Bottom line
Several weeks ago, a LATAM Boeing 777 suffered a tail strike while taking off at Milan Malpensa Airport. While tail strikes happen, they’re not very common while taking off in routine conditions.
Italy’s investigators have now released their preliminary findings from this incident, and this mistake was really bad. The pilots had entered the wrong information into the flight management system, so they calculated incorrect takeoff speeds. As a result, they rotated way too early, causing runway scrapings 723 meters in length. Worst of all, the person flying this segment was an instructor captain.
What do you make of this LATAM Boeing 777 incident?
"Based on my understanding, it should’ve been obvious to the pilots that a fully loaded 777 taking off on a hot day wouldn’t have these takeoff parameters."
There's a common problem with people doing something over and over again that they get used to it, and won't contest their decision.
...Those B777 pilots must have operated several flights with that low TOW and V-speeds that them seeing the numbers, won't look strange to them.
"Based on my understanding, it should’ve been obvious to the pilots that a fully loaded 777 taking off on a hot day wouldn’t have these takeoff parameters."
There's a common problem with people doing something over and over again that they get used to it, and won't contest their decision.
Those B777 pilots must have operated several flights with that low TOW and V-speeds that them seeing the numbers, won't look strange to them.
In around 2003, Emirates had this issue with the A340 (A340-500 out of Sydney if I'm correct, might be Johannesburg), they entered a TOW about 100t less than the actual weight for a 12+hrs flight. They didn't question the numbers because they do operate flights at around that weight.
This LATAM pilots might have fallen victim of that.
Though there are checklist to detect this issue, the question now should be was the checklist followed correctly, and why did the error slip. Not whether the pilots knowing their plane should weigh more than they believed it to weigh.
With all the AI technology out there, a simple transmit of the flight parameters that were manually entered on "older" planes to the airlines' ground flight control center and this safety check could easily catch these issues (note that the AI is used to validate not set the flight parameters).
Also, all the pilots should be fired.... There are pre-flight checklists where the co-pilot independently goes throught the flight parameter settings as entered by the...
With all the AI technology out there, a simple transmit of the flight parameters that were manually entered on "older" planes to the airlines' ground flight control center and this safety check could easily catch these issues (note that the AI is used to validate not set the flight parameters).
Also, all the pilots should be fired.... There are pre-flight checklists where the co-pilot independently goes throught the flight parameter settings as entered by the captain. This was obviously not done. Also, on Youtube videos I always see the captain and/or co-pilot do some manual verification/sanity check on things like calculated V1/V2 numbers to ensure that they are getting the same numbers with manual calculation (# of Passengers, cargo weight, fuel weight, environmentally conditions at takeoff.....) Inexcusable. I am getting more and more scared of flying these "third world" airlines.... Are these pilots really taking their jobs seriously or simply "basking" at achieving pilot/captain status and totally depend on avionics automation to do the "work" of flying. The last incident was that Asiana crash in SFO where this was supposedly a captain with umpteen hours in the cockpit.
Why would the computer not beep out a warning? Should be simple to realize that this is not ideal and say “are you sure this is what you want??”
Unfortunately, not much useful info here. When the video first surfaced, it was pretty obvious what happened. At the end of the day we know what happened but in order to progress, we need to understand why it happened. The experience of the crew is hardly relevant; everyone is human and susceptible to failings. Robust SOP's, with stringent crosscheck procedures are generally used. I cannot imagine a circumstance where a junior pilot would not speak...
Unfortunately, not much useful info here. When the video first surfaced, it was pretty obvious what happened. At the end of the day we know what happened but in order to progress, we need to understand why it happened. The experience of the crew is hardly relevant; everyone is human and susceptible to failings. Robust SOP's, with stringent crosscheck procedures are generally used. I cannot imagine a circumstance where a junior pilot would not speak up as the consequences are immediately obvious, so I don't believe that to be a factor. Instead we need to focus on whether the SOP's were followed. If so, is there a critical hole in the procedure? If not, what were the reasons? Distraction? Workload? In this case, can the procedures be improved. Can we introduce technological resources to reduce the risk of such errors. I'm afraid that simply stating things like the pilots were incompetent is naive and does not advance safety. This story still has a long way to run and we will have to see the final report to really understand what happened.
What I can't understand is that in This Day and Age with the amount of technology available, why, the aircraft cannot sense it's own weight and then if the crew input the wrong weight then the computer will issue a warning. I'm sure it wouldn't be a big issue to modify the current system of statically weighing the aircraft in the hanger, ie the engineers fit weight sensors between the aircraft and the jacks then...
What I can't understand is that in This Day and Age with the amount of technology available, why, the aircraft cannot sense it's own weight and then if the crew input the wrong weight then the computer will issue a warning. I'm sure it wouldn't be a big issue to modify the current system of statically weighing the aircraft in the hanger, ie the engineers fit weight sensors between the aircraft and the jacks then jack up the aircraft , this then displays the aircraft weight which the engineers use in their calculations of the aircraft's mass and balance. I would think this would be a relatively simple modification to include these type of sensors during assembly. Can any of the Boffins offer any explanation?
This type of pilot error has been going on for decades. In 1970 Clipper 845, a 747, took out the approach lights at the end of the runway they were departing from because they had the incorrect speeds and rotated too late.
Aren't 777-300's equipped with tail skids?
Pretty incompetent pilots
Same issues in medicine. Nobody will speak up and question a big shot doctor, even when they are killing patients due to negligence.
Same in auditing, although worse because the incentive (do not annoy the client) is directly opposed to doing the right thing.
Any architects/engineers/lawyers etc out there like to comment on whether the same issue exists in their fields?
This is not a tail strike, it’s a tail drag. They miscalculated but by heck of a lot.
Qatar had exactly the same incident at MIA in September 2015, also on a 77W, but there they carried all the way onto DOH even after the tailstrike.
That one had some different issues, not quite exactly the same
The problem with such senior Pilots doing incorrect take Off Calculations could have been very easily sorted out with a Flight Engineer in cockpit
I operated 747/200/300 Aircraft and it worked that both co-piiot and Engineer did the calculations separate from eachother independently and then it was checked before being accepted
I also operated the Illogical Airbus 340 series Aircraft, which had problems that not even the Factory could sort out, and during...
The problem with such senior Pilots doing incorrect take Off Calculations could have been very easily sorted out with a Flight Engineer in cockpit
I operated 747/200/300 Aircraft and it worked that both co-piiot and Engineer did the calculations separate from eachother independently and then it was checked before being accepted
I also operated the Illogical Airbus 340 series Aircraft, which had problems that not even the Factory could sort out, and during my 4 and a half years , left Airline and noticed that crew's where lossing their skills, so went back to operation in 747/300 operations until my Retirement
I
The extent to which there were very senior crews on this and many similar incidents makes me think the airline industry really needs to continue the work that CRM started. Still so many crashes where seniority plays a role...
Do insructing captains fly less than average (because they spend more time in the office on admin?)
If so, the assisting pilots should be put on notice to be particularly careful on such flights.
In a way the training captains do spend less time doing actual flying.
Think of the infamous Tenerife runway collision in 1977. Captain Van Zant had done very little ACTUAL flying recently. He spent his days in the simulator with trainees, pulling double-duty as pilot monitoring and air traffic control clearance reader.
Obviously, in the simulator, you're not going to hold the plane for an extended period of time. That's just wasted time,...
In a way the training captains do spend less time doing actual flying.
Think of the infamous Tenerife runway collision in 1977. Captain Van Zant had done very little ACTUAL flying recently. He spent his days in the simulator with trainees, pulling double-duty as pilot monitoring and air traffic control clearance reader.
Obviously, in the simulator, you're not going to hold the plane for an extended period of time. That's just wasted time, so he's going to clear his trainee for takeoff as soon as they're on the runway.
He fell into his simulator habits when flying on the line (immediate takeoff), and the other two in the cockpit felt unable to correct him.
That didn't necessarily make him an evil man, or a bad man, but it does indicate a training captain should be scrutinized when it comes to irregular operations (delays, last-second changes, etc), because they're normally not being blindsided by that in THEIR normal day.
This weight calculation, however, should have been routine. They do it every flight.
Human error again and again and again.
Removing human error from flying is long overdue.
This comment has no basis in reality, unless humans are constantly causing airline flights to crash and I just live under a rock. One incident like this does not offset the other 10K flights that happened that day, alone. Further, what do you suggest to remove the human input to an FMS? Because if that answer is connecting it to a network and transferring data over, a human will still need to review and that’s...
This comment has no basis in reality, unless humans are constantly causing airline flights to crash and I just live under a rock. One incident like this does not offset the other 10K flights that happened that day, alone. Further, what do you suggest to remove the human input to an FMS? Because if that answer is connecting it to a network and transferring data over, a human will still need to review and that’s now subject to hacking. Hard pass on that. The standard whereby one pilot enters and one checks is working just fine….
Two independently entering an comparing answers sounds even better.
No need to go full NASA and have 4 independently programmed computers, but duplication of quick calculations does not seem onerous.
@Albert
That was precisely the outcome at Emirates after the Melbourne incident. Both had to independently come up with takeoff data with the data entry crosschecked.
@DFW Flyer
But humans ARE constantly causing flights to crash. Statistically, look at all crashes and how many human error have contributed.
Your argument is as stupid as 1 mass shooting should not offset all the billion people who didn't get shot that day. Therefore guns are safe.
And if you're paranoid about being hacked, everything today is subject to hack. Adding humans just creates more chaos and confusion.
Calling this no basis, is because...
@DFW Flyer
But humans ARE constantly causing flights to crash. Statistically, look at all crashes and how many human error have contributed.
Your argument is as stupid as 1 mass shooting should not offset all the billion people who didn't get shot that day. Therefore guns are safe.
And if you're paranoid about being hacked, everything today is subject to hack. Adding humans just creates more chaos and confusion.
Calling this no basis, is because you and most people lack the understanding.
@Albert
You fail to factor in the additional workload and possibly overwhelming or distracting other critical decisions.
Humans are bad, very very bad at repetitive task. Unfortunately, flying checklists are repetitive.
The problem is that humans also write the code and build and maintain the equipment. You're not removing human error, you're just changing where it occurs. Seems to me for calculations like this, KISS is best even if humans occasionally mess up a number and drag a tail as a result.
@Eskimo
Comparing the risk tolerances of commercial aviation procedures to gun laws is absolutely insane. In stark contrast to shootings, every incident in aviation is studied and changes are made to improve safety if necessary. Maybe LATAM has a procedure that needs to be changed, but the fact remains that major aviation incidents are extremely limited; there have been 21 total accidents in the US that have ever caused 100 or more deaths. Why...
@Eskimo
Comparing the risk tolerances of commercial aviation procedures to gun laws is absolutely insane. In stark contrast to shootings, every incident in aviation is studied and changes are made to improve safety if necessary. Maybe LATAM has a procedure that needs to be changed, but the fact remains that major aviation incidents are extremely limited; there have been 21 total accidents in the US that have ever caused 100 or more deaths. Why would you open up a system to hacking when it’s not even remotely necessary? There are thousands of people who would love to hack a plane component, vs at least tao competent pilots who don’t want to die. Maybe you’re not a pilot and my guess is you don’t have a degree in math/stats, either, but you’re proposing a solution to a non-issue that potentially creates a new, worse issue.