Goodness gracious, two Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) pilots are going to have some explaining to do (thanks to Hans for flagging this)…
In this post:
SAS pilots accelerate to 107 knots on Brussels taxiway
This incident happened on Thursday, February 5, 2026, and involves SAS flight SK2590, scheduled to operate from Brussels (BRU) to Copenhagen (CPH). The 470-mile flight was supposed to be operated by an Airbus A320neo with the registration code SE-ROM.
The plane was running behind schedule — while it was supposed to depart at 8:30PM, it ended up only departing at 9:44PM. However, it never actually got off the ground.
The pilots were supposed to taxi out to runway 7R. Instead, they turned too early, and ended up starting their takeoff roll on taxiway V1, which is parallel to the runway (presumably they were planning on doing a midfield takeoff). The pilots accelerated on the taxiway, to the point that the plane reached 107 knots (123 miles per hour), which is approaching the plane’s typical takeoff speed (130+ knots).
The thing is, the taxiway is way shorter than the runway, so they were quickly running out of space for their takeoff roll. So they then started decelerating, and reportedly ended up at the very end of the taxiway, even skidding into the grass. Passengers and crew had to be evacuated. Those onboard describe this as a terrifying incident, with strong braking to slow the plane down (in addition to flaps and reverse thrusters).
Weather conditions at the time of the incident were fine, so that doesn’t appear to be a factor here. In a statement, the airline shared that “safety is our absolute priority,” and “we are currently conducting a thorough internal investigation alongside local authorities to understand the sequence of events.”
This is really bad, and this was a very close call
This isn’t the first time that pilots have tried to take off on a taxiway, and it also certainly won’t be the last. It’s by no means common, but it does happen.
That being said, this is one of the worst versions of this that I’ve ever seen. That’s because this was an incredibly close call. A vast majority of the time when this happens, the pilots quickly realize what’s going on, and come to a stop with room to spare.
In this case, the plane got to such a high speed that it was only able to come to a stop by ultimately skidding off the taxiway, leading to aircraft damage.
This is a real head-scratcher. With the number of flights that operate every day, some incidents are bound to happen. Still, runways and taxiways look completely different in terms of their lighting, so it’s amazing that neither of the two pilots realized something was wrong when they started their takeoff roll.
It’s bad enough for this to happen in the first place, and for pilots to quickly realize the mistake. But to accelerate for that long, only to then run out of taxiway is really puzzling.
Bottom line
An SAS Airbus A320neo tried to take off from a taxiway at Brussels Airport. The pilots lined the plane up with a taxiway parallel to the runway, accelerated the aircraft, and it reached 107 knots, before they aborted the takeoff.
The issue is, the taxiway was much shorter than the runway, so the pilots found themselves with an unenviable choice, where they neither had sufficient distance to stop with a safety margin, nor did they have enough distance to take off. So the plane ended up skidding off the taxiway, forcing an evacuation.
It’ll be fascinating to see what an investigation into this incident reveals.
What do you make of this SAS A320neo takeoff mess?
Very odd at this point. There are automated systems to warn/confirm that you're on runway xyz that should be audible. Maybe they didn't have this and were totally not paying attention. Probably going to be suspended/fired.
The ADBS tracking from ADBS exchange shows they slowed down before they reached the C1 intersection. So, the getting on to grass might be hyperbole.
It would be interesting to know if they were cleared for 25L or 07R or even 01. And if the realization came from ATC or by themselves. Can't find the ATC recording for this.
If 25L then they might have legitimately turned left into C7 to then go on to...
The ADBS tracking from ADBS exchange shows they slowed down before they reached the C1 intersection. So, the getting on to grass might be hyperbole.
It would be interesting to know if they were cleared for 25L or 07R or even 01. And if the realization came from ATC or by themselves. Can't find the ATC recording for this.
If 25L then they might have legitimately turned left into C7 to then go on to C1 for either an offset take off on 25L or a back-taxi on 25L. That would indicate they lost it somewhere down C7.
If 07R, then it would indicate a wrong turn left. But directionally aligned with 07R.
This incident is a terrifying case study in Expectation Bias overriding sensory input. The "Swiss Cheese" model didn't just align holes here; the pilots punched through them.
Forget the 107 knots for a second. The fundamental failure happened at 0 knots.
Taxiways have Green centerline lights and Blue edge lights.
Runways have White centerline lights and White edge lights.
The visual picture is radically different. For two qualified pilots to line...
This incident is a terrifying case study in Expectation Bias overriding sensory input. The "Swiss Cheese" model didn't just align holes here; the pilots punched through them.
Forget the 107 knots for a second. The fundamental failure happened at 0 knots.
Taxiways have Green centerline lights and Blue edge lights.
Runways have White centerline lights and White edge lights.
The visual picture is radically different. For two qualified pilots to line up, look at a sea of green and blue lights, and still push the thrust levers to TOGA means their brains were effectively "hallucinating" the runway they expected to see because they were rushing to recover a delayed schedule.
Technically, this raises massive questions about the RAAS (Runway Awareness and Advisory System). The A320neo avionics suite should have audibly annunciated "ON TAXIWAY" or "AIRPORT MAP MISMATCH" the moment they aligned. Even if the active alert failed, the absence of the standard "ON RUNWAY 07R" callout should have been a hard stop.
This wasn't just a navigational error; it was a total breakdown of the verify-confirm loop. We rely on automation to catch human errors, but if the crew is mentally tunneled, they will ignore the warnings designed to save them.
Awesome AI.
As far as I know, the Honeywell RAAS is not necessarily standard on all A320neo aircraft.
At least from my previous experience, I even know of airlines where among the same subtypes, some aircraft had the system installed while others didn't, which can lead to additional challenges with expectation bias. This specifically is often seen with fleet mergers or acquisitions from other airlines. Agree with all other points though in principle.